Scott Barrett (2/15/17)

Scott Barrett (2/15/17)

Scott Bsbarrettarrett

Columbia University
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“Property Rights vs. Cooperative Agreements on the Global Ocean Commons”

Abstract: Collective action for managing the world’s ocean fisheries relies on two main types of institution, property rights (exclusive economic zones), which are established in customary law, and cooperative agreements (regional fisheries management organizations), which are established in treaty law. In this paper I develop a model in which both institutions emerge as equilibrium outcomes of an ocean fisheries game. I show that, as a general matter, both institutions help to limit overfishing of highly migratory stocks but that neither institution alone, nor both together, can suffice to overcome collective action failures on the global ocean commons. Full Paper

Thomas R. Covert (12/7/16)

Thomas R. Covert (12/7/16)

tcovert

Thomas R. Covert

University of Chicago
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“Learning to be productive and learning to produce in the North Dakota Shale Boom”

Abstract:The learning-by-doing literature shows that firms with more experience make more efficient choices about unobserved factors of production.  That is, firms learn to be productive.  In this paper, I argue that experience may also help firms learn to make improved choices about observed factors, so that firms learn how to produce.  In administrative data documenting the use of hydraulic fracturing technology by firms in North Dakota’s shale oil boom, I find that these firms primarily learned how to produce.  While productivity of the average well is stable across cohorts, firms made more efficient choices about observable inputs in later cohorts than they did in earlier cohorts.  To determine whether this can be explained by learning, I measure the efficiency of input choices using production function estimates based on data about fracking technology that was available to firms when they made those choices.  These ex ante measures of efficiency are more stable than ex post measures, and suggest that the continual arrival of publicly available data on fracking inputs and oil production helped firms learn how to optimize the fracking production function.

 

Ignacia Mercadal (11/16/16)

Ignacia Mercadal (11/16/16)

ignaciamercadalIgnacia Mercadal

Columbia University
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“Dynamic competition and arbitrage in electricity markets: The role of financial players”

Abstract: I study the role of purely financial trading in wholesale electricity markets, where financial transactions take place alongside sales and purchases by physical participants, which are mostly utilities and generators. I focus on the Midwest electricity market, where a  regulatory change that exogenously attracted more financial bidders in 2011 acts as a natural experiment. Using a rich dataset on individual behavior, I examine how both physical and financial participants responded, and find that  financial trading decreases generators market power, but does not fully eliminate it. As a consequence, consumers are better off but productive efficiency might go down. I develop a test of the hypothesis of static Nash equilibrium, which is required for the validity of standard policy evaluation and structural IO tools. In order to implement the test, I present a new method to study the competitive structure of electricity markets using machine learning tools to define markets. I reject the null of static Nash in favor of dynamic competition.

 

Janet Currie (11/02/16)

Janet Currie

Janet CurrieJanet Currie

Princeton University
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“Lead, Delinquency, and Crime: Evidence from Rhode Island”

Abstract: High blood lead levels have been linked to greater aggressiveness and criminal activity, but the question of whether there is a causal link, or of whether low levels of lead exposure also matter, are controversial.  Using linked administrative data for all Rhode Island children born between 1991 and 2005, we examine the relationship between blood lead levels, school disciplinary infractions, and detention the juvenile justice system.   Because exposure to lead is linked to many markers of lower socioeconomic status which are themselves predictive of delinquency and crime, our preferred estimates instrument blood lead levels by a proxy for exposure to lead contaminated soils near major roadways.  However, while the instrumental variables estimates are the largest, all of the estimation methods we use, including mother fixed effects, suggest large positive effects of reducing lead from already relatively low levels in terms of reducing delinquency and crime.

Vallerie Mueller (10/19/16)

Vallerie Mueller (10/19/16)

mueller_valerieValerie Mueller

Interntional Food Policy Research Institute
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“Labor Response to Climate Variation in Eastern Africa”

Abstract: Knowledge of how changing climate affects workers is crucial to designing effective adaptation policy. Nonetheless, temperature impacts on labor markets are poorly understood, especially in Africa. We address this gap by analyzing panel surveys of labor participation by activity, contractual arrangement, and migration status in four East African countries. We develop a multi-sector labor allocation model to understand the complex relationship between climate productivity impacts and micro-level occupational responses. Using high-resolution climate data, we apply the model to assess labor responses to local temperature anomalies. In rural areas, high temperatures induce a decline in participation in non-agricultural self employment. Urban areas likewise see a decline in non-agricultural self employment, accompanied by a decline in temporary migration. Unlike in rural areas, other sectors are unable to absorb the excess workers leading to an increase in urban unemployment.

Akshaya Jha (10/05/16)

Akshaya Jha (10/05/16)

akshaya-jha_200x200Akshaya Jha

Carnegie Mellon University
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“The Local Environmental Consequences of Coal Procurement at U.S. Power Plants”

Abstract: There are known to be significant environmental costs associated with burning coal in order to generate electricity. However, there are also sizable local environmental health costs associated with power plants’ coal purchase and storage behavior. We find that a 10% increase in coal stockpiles (number of deliveries) is associated with a 0.02% (0.07%) increase in the concentration of fine particulates on average. Local populations exposed to these fine particulates (PM2.5) have increased risk of lung and heart conditions. Translating the increase in PM2.5 associated with plants’ coal procurement behavior into mortality risk and monetizing this mortality risk, we calculate local environmental costs between $0.004-$0.02 per KWh. Finally, we show that the average increase in mortality rates associated with an increase in PM2.5 are substantially higher when we instrument using coal stockpiles and number of deliveries relative to OLS specifications; this result provides both a new identification strategy for the link between mortality rates and PM2.5 as well as further empirical evidence of the link between PM2.5 and plants’ coal procurement behavior.

Chris Costello (9/21/16)

Chris Costello (9/21/16)

Chris CostelloChris Costello

UC Santa Barbara
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“Private Eradication of Mobile Public Bads”

Abstract: We consider analytically the non-cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad such as an invasive weed species, infectious disease, fire, or agricultural pest.  The stock of the public bad can grow and disperse across a spatial domain of arbitrary size.  In this setting, we characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate, and determine how this decision depends on property-specific environmental features and on the behavior of other landowners.  We show that high mobility or lower control by others result in lower private control. But when the marginal dynamic cost of the bad is sufficiently large, we find that complete eradication may be privately optimal (despite the lack of consideration of others’ welfare) — in these cases, eradication arises in the non-cooperative game and is also socially optimal so there is, in effect, no externality. Finally, when property harboring the bad is not owned, or is owned in common, we derive the side payments required to efficiently control the mobile public bad.

Mathias Reynaert (9/7/16)

Mathias Reynaert (9/7/16)

Mathias ReynaertMathias Reynaert

Toulouse
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“Consumer Valuation of Fuel Costs and the Effectiveness of Tax Policy: Evidence from the European Car Market”

Abstract: To what extent do car buyers undervalue future fuel costs, and what does this imply for the effectiveness of alternative tax policies? To address both questions, we show it is crucial to account for consumer heterogeneity in mileage and other dimensions.We use detailed product-level data for a long panel of European countries, and exploit variation in fuel prices by engine type. Although we find there is modest undervaluation of fuel costs, fuel taxes are still more effective in reducing fuel usage than product taxes based on fuel economy. The reason is that fuel taxes better target the right consumers, those with a high mileage, to purchase more fuel efficient cars.

Seema Jayachandran (8/24/16)

Seema Jayachandran (8/24/16)

Seema JayachandranSeema Jayachandran

Northwestern University
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“Cash for Carbon: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Deforestation”

Abstract: This paper evaluates a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) program in western Uganda that offered forest-owning households cash payments if they conserved their forest. The program was implemented as a randomized trial in 121 villages, 60 of which received the program for two years. The PES program reduced deforestation and forest degradation: Tree cover, measured using high-resolution satellite imagery, declined by 2% to 5% in treatment villages compared to 7% to 10% in control villages during the study period. We find no evidence of shifting of tree-cutting to nearby land. We also use the estimated effect size and the “social cost of carbon” to value the delayed CO2 emissions, and compare this benefit to the program’s cost.